Corporate Governance Effects on Innovation when both Agency Costs  and Asset Specificity Matter by Belloc, Filippo et al.
Corporate Governance Effects on Innovation
when both Agency Costs and Asset Specificity Matter
Filippo Belloc ∗
Department of Economic Studies, University “G. d’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara
Eleonora Laurenza†
Bank of Italy - Economic and Financial Statistics Department
M. Alessandra Rossi‡
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Siena
Abstract
The paper explores the question whether the relationship between corporate governance and innovation
is affected by the extent to which the firm is exposed to agency problems and asset specificity issues. In
particular, we argue that different combinations of asset specificity and agency costs are associated to firm
age and sector of activity and predict heterogenous effects of ownership concentration on innovation across
different types of firms. We use a unique dataset on about 35.000 Italian manufacturing corporations over
the 2002-2007 period and run a hurdle model, distinguishing four sub-groups of firms on the basis of their
age (greater or lower than 15 years) and of whether they belong to a high technology or low technology
sector. We find that the effects of ownership concentration on innovation are coherent with the predictions of
so-called “shareholder theory” when agency cost effects dominate over asset specificity effects and that they
are coherent with the predictions of so-called “stakeholder theory” when asset specificity effects dominate
over agency cost effects. These findings are robust to a number of identification issues, including the possible
endogeneity of corporate ownership structures. Our results may allow to make sense of the contradictory
findings of the literature on corporate governance and innovation, especially as regards the role played by
ownership concentration, and may help policy-makers to define more effective type-specific initiatives to
stimulate firm innovation.
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of empirical studies widely acknowledges that corporate governance is crucial to the
ability of corporations to produce successful technological innovations, as it influences both the degree of
protection that financiers expect to receive for their investments, and therefore the cost at which investors are
willing to provide capital, and the incentives of corporation’s members to apply their skills and effort to the
implementation of innovation strategies (for a survey, see Belloc, 2012).
There are many theoretical explanations of the mechanisms underlying this relationship, but a broad distinc-
tion may be traced among the various contributions according to whether they place emphasis on agency costs
or on asset specificity. When attention is focused on agency costs and asymmetric information, the relationship
between corporate governance variables and innovation is explained on the basis of their effects on shareholders’
and creditors’ ability to monitor the management, along the lines of the seminal contribution by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). Contributions of this sort have been dubbed to belong to a “shareholder approach”. The
“stakeholder approach”, by contrast, draws attention on the underinvestment problem due to the risk of hold up
that may emerge in presence of asset specificity in an incomplete contracting framework. Corporate governance
variables, from this perspective, matter for innovation because they alter the allocation of control rights and
therefore affect incentives (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart and Moore, 1990).
The two approaches lead to different predictions as to the expected relationship between corporate gover-
nance dimensions and innovation. This holds, in particular, for ownership concentration. Shareholder theory
predicts a clear positive effect of ownership concentration on innovation because, in a nutshell, concentration re-
duces the well-known free rider problem emerging when the benefits of monitoring activity are dispersed among
multiple shareholders, thus increasing overall incentives to monitor the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Stakeholder theory, on the other side, predicts a negative effect of ownership concentration because the latter
may cause asymmetric bargaining between shareholders and other firm stakeholders, consequently reducing
their incentives to apply effort to firm-specific activities ex-ante to the extent they anticipate opportunistic
actions ex-post by concentrated shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Aghion and
Tirole, 1997; Burkardt et al., 1997).
Empirical analysis has not so far been able to unambiguously conclude that one approach has a greater
explanatory power than the other, as there are empirical contributions supporting both sets of predictions
(e.g., Hill and Snell (1989), Baysinger et al. (1991), Francis and Smith (1995), Battaggion and Tajoli (2001),
Hosono et al. (2004) and Ortega-Argile`s et al. (2005)).
This paper aims to address this empirical puzzle. We move from the hypothesis that the two theoretical
approaches are complementary and both have merit. We posit that the effects singled out by the two theories
most likely coexist and that whether we observe empirically one effect or the other depends on firm-specific
features affecting the relative strength of agency costs and asset specificity. We test this hypothesis by estimating
the impact of corporate governance features on patenting activity for four sub-groups of Italian manufacturing
firms, identified on the basis of whether they belong to a high tech or low tech sector and of their age. Previous
literature has clarified that a firm’s sector of activity and age are associated in predictable ways to the extent
of asset specificity and agency costs. In particular, both asset specificity and agency costs increase with R&D
intensity (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Aghion et al., 2004; Brown and Petersen, 2009), while agency costs
decrease and asset specificity increases with firm age (Hall and Lerner, 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2008). Grouping
firms according to these two features thus allows to identify firms facing different combinations of asset specificity
and agency costs.
We employ a unique dataset built on the matching of the European Patent Office (EPO, 2013) Worldwide
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Patent Statistical Database and the Aida database containing information on a large sample of manufacturing
companies in Italy provided by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD, 2013). We then implement a hurdle model to study
both extensive and intensive margins of firms’ innovation and obtain informative correlations linking a firm’s
governance to its innovation performance.
We find that the effects of corporate governance features on innovation are coherent with the predictions
of shareholder theory when agency cost effects dominate over asset specificity effects; that they are coherent
with the predictions of stakeholder theory when asset specificity effects dominate over agency cost effects and
that the two effects balance out for firms for which the two types of effects are either both very strong or
very weak and therefore tend to balance out. In particular, our estimates suggest that, in high technology
sectors, the probability of being innovative for old firms belonging to the low ownership concentration class
(i.e., no shareholder controls the firm by more than 25%) is, all else being equal, 2.15 times that of firms with
a medium ownership concentration rate (i.e., one or more shareholders control the firm by more than 25% and
less than 50% of shares) and 2.73 times that of firms with a high ownership concentration rate (i.e., one or
more shareholders control the firm by more than 50% of shares).
We improve with respect to previous literature in two main ways. First, and most importantly, we highlight
a novel aspect of the corporate governance-innovation relationship by setting apart different types of firms on
the basis of their age and sector of activity. This allows us to show empirically that ownership concentration
affects innovation output in a heterogenous manner, depending on the relative importance of asset specificity
and agency costs effects for different types of firms. While most empirical studies refer to specific sectors, due
to data availability constraints, and have never explicitly considered the coexistence of agency costs and asset
specificity issues, we are able to reconcile “shareholder theory” and “stakeholder theory” and to draw some new
policy insights that may help policy-makers to define more effective type-specific initiatives to stimulate firm
innovation. Second, we use a novel database covering a very large sample of firms. This allows us to investigate
simultaneously the effect of all the relevant corporate governance variables on innovation outcomes for different
sub-groups of firms.
In section 2 we provide some background on the relationship between corporate governance variables and
innovation. In section 3 we develop the theoretical framework of analysis and put forward the main hypotheses
to be tested. In section 4 we present the econometric model and the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background on corporate ownership and innovation
Ownership concentration is the corporate governance dimension that has attracted the greatest attention and
is acknowledged to be at the core of the relationship between firms’ governance and innovation. The corporate
ownership dimension refers to the distribution of control rights and residual profit rights within the corporation,
and particularly to the degree of equity concentration among shareholders.
To explain how this corporate governance feature influences firm-level innovation two main approaches have
developed. The first finds it roots in agency theory and focuses on the incentive issues arising from the sepa-
ration of ownership and control (see, e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is dubbed
“shareholder approach” because it emphasizes the role of shareholders as the only residual claimants of the
firms’ activity and, relatedly, the sole responsible for productive investments affecting firm performance. Share-
holders make, in particular, key investments in monitoring the management. The second approach considers a
wider range of stakeholders relevant to firm performance, which is conceptualized as dependent on firm-specific
investments in assets or human capital made by shareholders, financiers, managers and employees in a context
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characterized by contractual incompleteness (see, e.g., Blair, 1995). Innovation performance, in particular,
depends on the ability to provide adequate incentives to make specific investments to all relevant stakeholders,
since innovation is, by definition, a collective and cumulative investment process, through which knowledge is
generated and competences accumulated.
The most apparent divergence between the two approaches relates to predictions as to the effects of different
degrees of ownership concentration on innovation performance. The “shareholder approach” to corporate
governance predicts, based on traditional agency theory arguments, that dispersed ownership gives rise to
suboptimal levels of monitoring, as the benefits of monitoring activity are not fully internalized by shareholders
due to free riding issues. According to this view, greater ownership concentration favors the alignment of
cash flow and control rights of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This may be particularly beneficial
with respect to innovation investments when the misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers
concerns the preferred degree of riskiness of the investment projects undertaken by the firm. Indeed, managers
may tend to refrain from undertaking high-risk R&D investments because they tend to bear the burden of
failures, while shareholders are more concerned with the upper tail of the distribution of returns from these
investments. This positive effect of ownership concentration on innovation has been detected by a number of
studies (Hill and Snell, 1988; Francis and Smith, 1995; Baysinger et al., 1991; Hosono et al., 2004), and it may
be called the “agency cost minimization effect”.
On the other side, the “stakeholder approach” predicts, based on incomplete contracts theory (Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990), that ownership concentration may negatively affect corporate invest-
ment activity. According to this view, ownership structure shapes the ex post bargaining over (and so the
final allocation of) the quasi-rent generated by the firm. Thus, ownership concentration may cause asymmetric
bargaining between controlling shareholders and other stakeholders, including minority shareholders, managers
and other employees. Since innovative activities are a complex, collective and cumulative endeavor requiring
financial, physical, and human capital specific investments, the disincentive effect of ownership concentration
towards non-owners may have particularly deep effects on performance. Aghion and Tirole (1997), for instance,
point to the fact that excessive control stifles managers’ incentives to acquire information in presence of uncer-
tainty. Along similar lines, Burkardt et al. (1997) emphasize that the firm ownership structure may act as a
commitment device to delegate a certain degree of control to management, so as to stimulate managerial initia-
tive (i.e., searching for innovative investment projects) and other firm-specific investments (see also Grossman
and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988)). The negative effects of ownership concentration on innovation
emphasized by the “stakeholder approach” to corporate governance may be called the “asymmetric bargaining
effect”. Empirical evidence exists that corroborates also this view (Battaggion and Tajoli, 2001; Ortega-Argile`s
et al., 2005; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009)
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
In this section, we develop a set of hypotheses regarding the association between firm-specific features, the
extent of agency costs and asset specificity involved by their activities and the expected effects of corporate
ownership variables on firm-level innovation. We focus on two firm-specific features – sector of activity and age
– that past literature and empirical evidence have shown to be unambiguously associated to different levels of
agency costs and different degrees of asset specificity.
To capture predictable differences in the extent of agency costs and asset specificity related to the firms’
sector of activity, we distinguish between firms in the high tech and low tech sectors, i.e. between firms operating
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in sectors characterized by a high R&D intensity and low R&D intensity, respectively. R&D investments amount
to a large extent (50 per cent or more, according to Hall (2009)) to investments in scientists’ and technicians’
wages and salaries, whose human capital makes up the firm’s knowledge base. Thus, high R&D intensity
also entails a high degree of intangibility and specificity of the firm’s assets. The relatively higher degree of
intangibility of the assets of firms operating in an R&D intensive environment has implications also for the
extent of agency costs they face. On one side, tangible assets may more easily be used as collateral to mitigate
moral hazard problems, as they entail a smaller loss of value in the event firms face financial distress. On the
other, intangible investments involve higher uncertainty and asymmetric information than more tangible ones
both because of the higher volatility of the environment firms face and because of firms’ reluctance to share
information on their R&D programs so as to avoid spillovers. Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Aghion et al.
(2004) and Brown and Petersen (2009), among others, indeed highlight that high tech firms face more severe
agency issues.
The relationship between firm age and the extent of agency costs involved by external financing is firmly
established by a large literature on small and new firms’ financial constraints (Hall and Lerner, 2010). For
younger firms, asymmetric information problems are most severe because they lack a track record through
which they may signal creditworthiness to potential investors. Thus, reputation may not be used as an effective
signal to address agency issues. Young firms also lack significant collateral, as they have a lower stock of
tangible assets (Hall, 2009). Finally, young firms tend to have higher growth rates, which increase their opacity
as an investment opportunity for external financiers (Frank and Goyal, 2008).
The extent of asset specificity involved by the firm’s activity and the scope of the ensuing potential un-
derinvestment problem are also predictably associated to firm age. Mature firms have larger stocks of assets,
which they have accumulated through past investments. These assets may be tangible, for instance in the form
of dedicated machinery and distribution systems, or intangible, in the form of firm-specific skills, accumulated
through human capital investments of long-term employees, experience curves, learning-by-doing and similar
phenomena. Thus, the impact on performance (including innovation performance) of asset specificity-related
issues of the type emphasized by the “stakeholder approach” is likely to be higher for mature firms than for
younger firms.
In sum, both asset specificity and agency costs increase with R&D intensity, while agency costs decrease and
asset specificity increase with firm age. While the strength and shape of these relationships are not necessarily
uniform, the different possible combinations of asset specificity and agency costs may provide insights as to the
expected significance and sign of the corporate governance variables we consider, along the lines described in
the following figure.
Figure 1 about here
Consider, first, the firms in quadrant I. These firms operate in an R&D-intensive environment and are old.
Both features suggest that they are expected to have a greater stock of tangible and intangible assets than
other firms and therefore that asset specificity issues are likely to have a significant impact on firm behavior.
The high level of asset specificity increases the relevance of the asymmetric bargaining problems between
block-holders and small outside investors and between shareholders and managers highlighted by proponents
of the “stakeholder theory”. R&D intensity may, of course, also increase the extent of agency costs, for the
reasons already explained, but firm age exerts a countervailing effect on their extent as the past history of the
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firm provides information that may mitigate asymmetric information. Thus, for firms in this quadrant, we
expect asset specificity effects to dominate over agency cost effects. Consequently, the sign of the ownership
concentration’s effect should be coherent with the “stakeholder theory” rather than with the “shareholder
theory” and therefore negative.
On the basis of the above we may put forward the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. When firms are old and operate in an R&D-intensive (high tech) sector, asset specificity
effects dominate over agency costs effects. This entails that ownership concentration has a negative effect on
innovation.
Firms in quadrant II are old and operate in a low tech environment. Here, agency costs are extremely low
due to both low R&D intensity and higher age. On the other side, also asset specificity is very low. While
mature firms may have accumulated assets over time, thus increasing their firm-specific components, it is also
true that operating in a low technology environment mainly requires traditional and well-established tangible
capital, pushing firms, even if old, to adopt more generic assets. The extent of asset specificity involved by
this type of firms is thus much more limited than for their counterparts in quadrant I, so that neither asset
specificity effects nor agency cost effects are likely to be binding on firms’ strategies. In particular, the positive
effects of ownership concentration predicted by the “shareholder theory” can be expected to be of a similar
order of magnitude of the negative effects of ownership concentration predicted by the “stakeholder theory” so
that, on average, they balance out, making ownership concentration not significant.
These considerations lead to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. When firms are old and operate in a low tech sector, neither agency costs nor asset specificity
effects matter greatly for performance, so that they balance out. This entails that ownership concentration is
not expected to have a significant effect on innovation.
Firms in quadrant III are young and operate in a low tech sector. Both features tend to reduce the
extent of asset specificity involved by their activities. In particular, their young age entails that their stock of
intangible capital is likely to be more limited than than accumulated by more established firms and their sector of
operation suggests a similar conclusion. Thus, for these firms, agency problems are likely to dominate over asset
specificity effects. More specifically, while in mature firms investors may rely on a greater amount of information
on the firm and they may be better able to understand, evaluate and measure the risks of their investment
projects, firm history and information available to third parties are more limited for young firms. For the latter,
greater ownership concentration may make it easier to identify those exercising control and may strengthen
fiduciary and reputational connections in the relationship between the owner(s) and external investors. Given
the relatively limited stock of firm-specific assets, the negative effects of ownership concentration predicted by
the “stakeholder theory” are not sufficiently strong to offset these positive effects of ownership concentration.
Hypothesis 3. When firms are young and operate in a low tech sector agency costs effects dominate over
asset specificity effects. This entails that ownership concentration has a positive effect on innovation.
For firms in quadrant IV, agency costs are even higher than for firms in quadrant III, but asset specificity
costs also increase, due to a higher R&D intensity. Technology intensity, in fact, induces firms to exploit newer
and more original production processes, and both old and young firms, in this type of environment, are likely
to need specific assets in their innovative productions. Asset specificity and agency costs effects, thus, are
both very relevant for firm performance and they may therefore balance out. More specifically, while in low
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tech sectors the easier identification of proprietors that is allowed for by ownership concentration may address
agency issues without giving rise to significant asymmetric bargaining problems, in high tech firms the latter
problems appear more severe. Indeed, while in low tech sectors investment opportunities are relatively well
known and standardized, in high tech sectors managerial initiative in the pursuit of valuable and less predictable
investment opportunities is crucial to firm performance. Thus, the positive effects of ownership concentration
predicted by the “shareholders theory” are not sufficiently strong to outweigh the negative effect of ownership
concentration predicted by the “stakeholder theory”, that are strengthened by the higher R&D intensity of
these firms.
On the basis of the above, we put forward the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. When firms are young and operate in an R&D-intensive (high tech) sector agency costs
and asset specificity effects are both very relevant for firm perfomance, so that they balance out. This entails
that ownership concentration is not expected to have a significant effect on innovation.
In testing for the above hypotheses we take into account the effects of a number of additional corporate
governance variables, including corporate finance, owners’ identity and listing on a stock exchange.
As for the first control variable, it is widely acknowledged that internally generated revenues should be the
preferred channel of innovation funding (Hall, 1992; Brealey et al., 2006), but internal financing constraints
may force corporations to raise additional capital in the form of debt and/or equity. The empirical literature
has clarified that a negative relationship exists between the proportion of debt in the firm’s capital structure
and its innovation performance (see, among many others, Bradley et al. (1984), Long and Malitz (1985) and
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989)). The reasons why debt capital is ill-suited to finance innovative projects have
to do with the deep information asymmetry (and the associated agency costs) that emerge between creditors
and shareholders in highly risky investment programs, often characterized by high levels of asset specificity.
Debt contracts may include debt covenants, through which lenders may protect themselves from too risky
investment choices made by shareholders, with the possible effect, however, of limiting the firm ability to
finance innovative projects through debt. Debt financing may also induce the firm to forgo some positive
net present value investment projects like R&D intensive programs (which would be undertaken if the firm
were totally financed through equity), due to payoffs insufficient to repay debt holders. When a firm is highly
leveraged, moreover, it may tend to refrain from R&D investments because the latter may increase both the
probability of financial distress, being associated to highly uncertain returns, and the cost of financial distress,
as they involve specific assets with low resale value and investments in human capital. Finally, the schedule
of interest payments associated to debt is not coherent with the distribution of returns from innovation, which
may take a long time to materialize and may be subject to a high volatility. This, again, may discourage highly
leveraged firms from undertaking investments in R&D, which have a high variance of returns (Gugler, 2001).
Equity, by contrast, is better suited to support innovation-related investments. It is risk capital meant to back
risky projects, as investors benefit from the upper part of the project returns’ distribution, unlike debt (Stiglitz,
1985). Moreover, it does not impose the firm a fixed schedule of payments and does not involve rising costs of
financial distress (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).
With respect to the owners’ identity, extant studies focus on ownership by families, banks and institutional
investors. While family-controlled companies are generally found to perform lower innovation activity than
corporations run by other types of blockholders (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Munari et al., 2010; Bugamelli et
al., 2012), the role played by banks and other institutional investors in corporate ownership is less clear. Bank
ownership may mitigate information asymmetries between firm and creditor, so increasing the financial resources
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that the firm can allocate to innovation projects (Lee, 2005); however, they may also impose risk aversion in
the business decision-making (Zahra, 1996; Kochhar and David, 1996; Tribo et al., 2007). Private investment
funds, on the other hand, typically have a preference for short-term profits and are shown to negatively affect
corporate innovation (Sherman et al., 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002), whilst other institutional entities (e.g.
pension and retirement funds) may be interested in long-term corporate performance.
Finally, we also consider the decision of the firm to list its shares on a stock exchange. While the stock
market may provide a mechanism for managerial discipline so inducing managerial performance improvements,
some studies argue that, in non-listed firms, insider shareholders can time the market by choosing an early exit
after receiving bad signals about production, and therefore managers are more tolerant of early failures and
more inclined to invest in innovative, even if riskier, projects (Ferreira et al., 2012).
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and variables
We use data on individual corporations’ characteristics and patents granted by the EPO to empirically explore
the relationship between corporate governance and innovation.
We measure corporation-level innovation activity by means of the yearly number of patents awarded to the
firm. Although patents do not fully capture firm innovation, they are commonly used as measures of firm-level
innovation because they are a relatively homogeneous indicator of innovative activity (as innovations have to
satisfy specific requirements to be patented) and allow for analyses at the level of the entire relevant population
(Griliches, 1990).1
We build a new database including information on worldwide-valid patents and Italian firms, limiting time
coverage to the 2002-2007 period in order to avoid data censoring problems (the process to formally obtain
patent registration at the EPO may take more than one year). Specifically, we matched two already existing
databases: the Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) provided by the EPO (2013) and the Aida database,
containing balance sheet information on Italian firms, provided by BvD (2013). The matching procedure is not
trivial. PATSTAT contains patent data on any type of innovative entity (i.e. the applicant) but does not permit
to identify the type of applicant (i.e. whether it is a public research entity, a university, a physical person or a
firm). Thus we have developed an original pattern-matching procedure to uniquely match each patent record
with the VAT number of its individual applicant. We then matched this extended records with the balance
sheet report of each Italian firm contained in the Aida sample.2 In this way we obtained a representative sample
of Italian manufacturing firms, with the additional information on their patent activity. After data cleaning, we
remain with about 100.000 observations on about 35.000 manufacturing corporations for the 2002-2007 period.
All innovative firms in our final sample (i.e. those firms that show at least one patent in the considered period)
are capital companies (Societa` per azioni - S.P.A. or Societa` a responsabilita` limitata - S.R.L.), none of them
is a labour-controlled firm (i.e. a cooperative).
1We are aware of the fact that patents suffer from many well-known limitations. They surely do not capture the entire output
of innovation activity, as firms may develop non patentable innovations and/or may decide to protect their innovations with
alternative appropriability strategies (e.g., trade secrets, other forms of intellectual property, complementary assets etc.) even if
they are patentable. However, other innovation indicators, like the number of new products and processes introduced, reflect greater
subjectivity in the assessment of what actually constitutes an innovation and are available only for the subset of the population
that has answered to the relevant survey where these data have been collected.
2The two-steps pattern-matching procedure allows to achieve a success rate of 98%. First, we used information retrieval
techniques to infer PATSTAT partition according to type of applicant. Second, we applied methods of data integration systems,
relying on a precise entity resolution algorithm. The latter basically performs a metric indexing of the involved databases and
extracts top-k correspondences, which are the entities (the firms in this case) that match with the highest likelihood. Indeed,
the algorithm runs within a self-developed software system, Glimpse, allowing to match any two datasets, according to different
customizable criteria.
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Thanks to the use of the Aida dataset, we can exploit a large number of variables in our empirical analysis.
In particular, we use information on firm age, number of employees, firm presence on the stock market, revenues
per employee, operational profitability, debt-equity ratio, intangible assets over total assets, degree of ownership
concentration, representative owner’s identity and her nationality. A detailed variables’ description is provided
in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
Being the information on the sector in which each firm operates at a 4-digit sectoral level, we were able to
assign each firm either to the high technology environment or to the low technology environment, according
to the classification of manufacturing industries into categories based on technological intensity proposed by
OECD (2011). Specifically, the OECD (2011) classification provides the division of manufacturing industries
into high technology, medium-high technology, medium-low technology and low technology groups based on the
ranking of manufacturing industries according to their average over 1991-1999 against aggregate OECD R&D
intensities. Industries classified to higher categories have a higher average intensity for both R&D expenditures
divided by value added and R&D expenditures divided by production than industries in lower categories.
To develop our empirical study, we converted the 4-class OECD classification into a 2-class classification
(high and medium-high technology are classified as high technology, while low and medium-low technology
are classified as low technology). In Table 2 we list the sectoral composition of the high technology and low
technology industrial clusters. We then divided our sample of firms between the two alternative technology
clusters and distinguished young firms from older ones, finally obtaining 4 sub-groups of observations. In
particular, the two age-based sub-groups include, respectively, firms with age up to 15 years and firms with age
starting from 16 years.3 On the one side, we are thus able to analyze the innovative behaviour of young firms
allowing them to conclude their long-term investment programs (R&D projects may take more than 10 years
to be completed) before switching to the old firms group; on the other, we keep the two age-based sub-groups
with comparable size, being the median age in our full sample of firms equal to 16 years.
Table 2 about here
Once firms are classified into high technology and low technology sectors and having divided our yearly
observations according to firm age, some interesting differences in the variables’ averages across the sub-groups
can be noticed.
Innovative firms in high technology sectors tend to hold a relatively higher number of patents than their low
technology counterparts, with the difference in patents endowment between high and low technology sectors
being relatively larger in the sub-group of older firms. High technology firms (in particular, older innovative
firms) also show larger size than low technology ones. Moreover, innovative firms, on average, tend to exhibit
relatively larger intangible assets to total assets ratios.
With respect to corporate governance variables, cross-group heterogeneity becomes more difficult to disen-
tangle. First, debt to equity ratios of both innovative and non-innovative firms tend to be relatively larger for
young firms in low technology sectors than for young firms in high technology sectors, while, in the case of
older firms, debt to equity ratios across technology groups show a relatively small difference. On average, the
3A firm’s age is defined as the number of years since the firm’s incorporation date.
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lowest debt to equity ratios can be observed among old high technology firms. Second, the relatively largest
share of listed firms can be observed in the sub-group of innovative young firms in the high technology cluster,
while being listed is less frequent among non-innovative firms (in particular, in low technology sectors). Third,
high ownership concentration rates are relatively common for innovative firms, with higher values for young
firms. Young firms also show relatively higher percentages of family owners; family owners, more specifically,
tend to dominate among non innovative firms. Industrial companies, at the opposite, tend to be the dominant
shareholders in innovative firms, with the exception of the low technology young firms sub-group. Fourth, and
finally, Italian nationality largely characterizes firm ownership in all the groups, with higher rates among non
innovative low technology firms. Variables’ averages within groups are collected in Table 3 and Table 4.
Table 3 about here
Table 4 about here
4.2 Econometric modeling
The use of patent data in econometric modeling can be problematic, since patent data are counts (i.e. non-
negative integers) and present typically a zero inflated distribution (see Hausman et al., 1984). To conduct our
empirical study, we implement a hurdle model, in which a logit model and a negative binomial regression are
combined in a two-part model.
Formally, we consider a random variable Y of patent counts in a panel of n firms (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) over T
times (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ) and two sets of exogenous variables xi,t1 and xi,t2. The hurdle model has a hierarchical
structure, where a first equation describes the process generating the zeros (i.e. the event yi,t = 0 versus yi,t > 0)
and a second equation describes the process accounting for positive values (i.e. yi,t > 0). In simple terms, a
binomial probability model governs the binary outcome of whether yi,t has a zero or a positive value, while, if
yi,t > 0, the “hurdle is crossed” and the conditional distribution of the positive values is governed by a zero-
truncated negative binomial model. Given a vector of regressors, xi, the canonical parameters for the binary
and the (truncated at zero) count processes, pii,t and λi,t, can be modeled, respectively, as logit(pii,t) = xi,t1β
and NB(λi,t) = xi,t2γ, where β and γ are vectors of fixed regression parameters. Hurdle models differ from
traditional zero-inflated models in having a joint probability function for the two model parts. In particular,
the hurdle model is based on a mixture of the two binary and count processes’ distributions. This implies a
single log-likelihood function maximization problem and rules out model identification issues (see Cragg (1971)
and Mullahy (1986)).4
In our regression context, the logit - negative binomial hurdle model can be specified as follows:
Pr(Yi,t > 0|xi,t, Dt) = α0 +αxi,t +ϕDt + i,tPr(Yi,t = yi,t|xi,t, Dt) = δ0 + δxi,t + ϑDt + ηi,t, yit ≥ 1 (1)
where α0 and δ0 are the model constants, α and δ are vectors of parameters associated with the vector
4As explained by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) and Hilbe (2010), in a hurdle model, the likelihood function is composed by two
parts, functionally independent, that are separately maximized. The first part uses the full sample, the second part uses only the
positive count observations. This independence assumption may be viewed as a limitation.
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of explanatory variables xi,t, ϕ and ϑ are vectors of parameters associated with the vector of year-specific
fixed effects Dt (from 2002 to 2007), i,t and ηi,t are the residuals. The vector of regressors xi,t contains
the following variables: Total patents, Intangibles, Firm size, Listed, Profitability, Revenues, Debt to equity,
OC-high, OC-medium, OC-low, RS-family, RS-bank, RS-holding, RS-ind company, RS-other, Italian RS, and
Sectoral growth.5 Sectoral growth, in particular, is introduced to control for market conditions and specifically
to proxy bearish versus bullish markets. Both equations are estimated on the four sub-populations of young
and old firms belonging to either low technology or high technology sectors separately. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at a firm-level.6
It is useful to interpret the logit equation and the negative binomial equation as models of, respectively,
extensive and intensive margins of firms’ patenting activity. In particular, with logit equation we are able to
estimate the effect of corporate observable characteristics on the probability of a firm’s being innovative rather
non-innovative (i.e. the wideness of innovation activity in a population of both innovative and non-innovative
firms). With the negative binomial equation we estimate the effect of corporate observable characteristics on
the extent to which innovative firms do obtain patents (i.e. the depth of innovation in a population of only
innovative firms). Phrased differently, through a hurdle model strategy we are able to study simultaneously
how a set of corporate governance variables and a vector of controls impact on both (i) the firm’s ability to
be innovative rather than non-innovative and (ii) its ability to be relatively more innovative than the other
innovative firms, allowing the two processes (i) and (ii) to be different. Therefore, this strategy also allows a
more refined measuring of parameters’ magnitudes than single-equation models, which conflate the two processes
and provide only average effects.
4.3 Results
Estimation results for the four sub-populations of young and old firms in high technology and low technology
sectors are reported in Table 5. In Table 5, model specifications (1) and (2) show estimation results obtained
for young firms in, respectively, low technology and high technology sectors, while model specifications (3) and
(4) show the estimates for the sub-groups of low technology and high technology old firms.
As a general remark, it is interesting to note from our estimation results that sectoral differences emerge
with respect to corporate governance variables, while the other basic firm characteristics (in particular, patent
endowments, intangibles to total assets ratios, size and revenues) exert virtually similar effects in both high
technology and low technology environments. This is consistent with the idea that the relationship between
corporate governance dimensions and innovation at the firm level is affected by sectoral features (in particular,
R&D intensity).
Table 5 about here
Corporate governance effects. Our research hypotheses concern the role of agency costs and asset specificity
in the innovation process, by considering, in particular, the main corporate governance variable to which they
are linked, i.e. ownership concentration. We thus first focus on the effects exerted by ownership concentration
rates and then we move to analyze the role of the other corporate governance features and control variables.
5We cannot include R&D expenses among the control variables as we observe a high number of missing data in our sample, due
to the fact that reporting R&D expenditures as a separate balance sheet item is not required by accounting and fiscal regulations in
Italy. Nonetheless, our Total patents variable, which is a proxy of the knowledge endowment available to the corporation, partially
captures also the past innovative effort of the firm.
6Notice that Firm age, Sectoral growth and Profitability are included in the model as observed at time t, with the aim of
measuring their current impact on innovation activity. All the other regressors, instead, are one-year-lagged in order to circumvent
possible reverse causality.
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Estimated ownership concentration effects corroborate our theoretical predictions summarized in Hypotheses
1, 2, 3 and 4. We find that OC-high and OC-medium (OC-low being the benchmark dummy) have a positive and
statistically significant effect (at a 1% level) in the intensive margin equation of young low technology firms, no
effect for young high technology firms and old low technology firms, and a negative and statistically significant
effect (between a 5% and a 10% level) in the extensive margin equation of old high technology firms. This result
confirms that, where asset specificity is extremely low (as for young firms in industries characterized by low
R&D intensity), agency problems dominate over asset specificity issues and a higher ownership concentration
tends to reduce agency costs significantly. The reverse is true for old high technology firms, in which firm-
specific asset development is more intense and firms progressively improve their production technologies on the
basis of their own specific business strategies and innovation projects.
The economic significance of the estimated coefficients is non-negligible. The magnitude of the effect of
ownership concentration rates on innovation probability can be easily obtained by calculating the odds ratios
of the logit regression parameters. We thus observe that, in high technology sectors, the probability of being
innovative for old firms belonging to the low ownership concentration class (i.e., no shareholder controls the
firm by more than 25%) is, all else being equal, 2.15 times that of firms with a medium ownership concentration
rate (i.e., one or more shareholders control the firm by more than 25% and less than 50% of shares) and 2.73
times that of firms with a high ownership concentration rate (i.e., one or more shareholders control the firm by
more than 50% of shares).
Besides the main corporate governance variable on which we focus our analysis, the regression estimates
provide interesting findings also concerning the other governance characteristics included in the model.
We find that Debt to equity has a negative impact (between a 1% and a 5% level of statistical significance) on
innovation for young firms both in low and high technology sectors (specifically, in the extensive and intensive
margin equations respectively) and for old firms in low technology sectors. Debt to equity ratios of high
technology old firms, instead, turn out statistically insignificant both in the logit and in the negative binomial
regression. This result indicates that debt financing is unlikely to bind corporate innovation strategies only in
established high technology firms, which tend to exploit debt finance to a lower extent than their low technology
and younger counterparts. Indeed, industry debt ratios tend to be low when profitability and business risk are
high and when the stock of firm intangibles is large (e.g., Long and Malitz, 1985; Barclay et al., 1995; Barclay
and Smith, 1999). On the contrary, for low technology and younger firms, our estimates suggest that a relatively
larger use of debt funds tends to intensify agency costs in a statistically significant way. In particular, a 1-point
reduction in the debt to equity ratio increases, on average, the probability of being innovative from 5.23% (in
the case of young low technology firms) to 5.86% (in the case of old low technology firms).
RS-holding and RS-ind company show a positive and statistically significant impact (RS-family being the
benchmark) on the extensive margin equation in both high technology and low technology sectors. RS-bank,
more specifically, is associated to a positive and statistically significant parameter only in the extensive margin
equation for young low technology firms. Interestingly enough, both bank and financial holding ownership have
a negative and statistically significant (at a 1% level) effect in the intensive margin equation for young high
technology firms. This may suggest that, while controlling ownership by bank and other financial institutions
may help the firm to overcome financial constraints at the earlier stages of business projects’ development,
and this can explain their positive effect in the extensive margin equations, once a young high technology firm
has become innovative, financial institutions may prefer to divest their interests by selling off their shares in
the company, so narrowing the possibility for the firm to have privileged access to debt capital and to carry
its R&D projects forward. It is worth pointing out that the negative effect of bank ownership emerges for
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both young high technology and old low technology firms (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 5), which are the
two groups of firms showing, on average, the highest percentages of banks as dominant shareholders (1.24%
and 1.02%, respectively). This is coherent with the idea that, while bank owners may be relatively more
effective in monitoring managerial activities so reducing the possibility of suboptimal use of free cash flows by
the management, they may also exert pressure on managers to focus on investment opportunities that are less
uncertain and more rewarding in the short-term (Ughetto, 2010).
It is also interesting to notice that Italian RS is associated to a statistically insignificant parameter in the
extensive margin equation both in the high technology and low technology sub-populations of firms. However,
it shows a negative impact in the intensive margin equation for young low technology firms. This result unveils
that owners’ nationality does not impact on the transition from a non-innovative to innovative status; here,
therefore, we cannot support previous evidence showing that cultural distance and information opacity make
foreign investors less capable to spur innovative investments (Ughetto, 2010). Rather, young firms in sectors
characterized by lower level of R&D intensitity seem to be negatively affected by Italian ownership in the ability
to increment their innovation output.
Listed, finally, has a negative impact on the intensive margin of innovation in young low technology firms
and a positive impact on the intensive margin for old high technology firms. This confirms that equity finance
is better suited to finance innovation projects when asset specificity issues are relatively more important (as for
old high technology companies).
Other firm-level effects. The other main firm-level control regressors exert effects of the same sign in both
low and high technology sectors, for both young and old firms.
In particular, Total patents has a positive and statistically significant effect on both extensive and intensive
margins of innovation. The strong linkages between innovative technologies in modern industrial sectors explain
why firms with larger endowments of patents show both a higher probability to become innovative in a given
year and a higher patenting performance than firms poor of proprietary knowledge.
Intangibles positively impacts on extensive margins in both high and low technology industries (with the
exception of young low technology firms). This shows how the firms’ level of intangible assets is a key variable
for the wideness of innovation activity in Italian industrial sectors. Intangible assets (including the quality
of management, firm’s trade secrets, and investments in R&D) form the “knowledge base” of corporations
and are widely recognized as a determinant of firms’ productivity in modern knowledge-intensive production
(e.g., Bontempi and Mairesse, 2008; Battisti et al., 2014). Here, we show that the impact of a firm’s stock of
intangibles is relevant, in particular, on the technological upgrade of the firm from the non-innovative to the
innovative status.
Firm size positively impacts on the extensive margin in both types of sectors and for both young and old
firms, while it has a statistically insignificant effect in the intensive margin equations for low technology firms.
Also this finding refines previous evidence. Bugamelli et al. (2012), among others, find that firm size, measured
through the number of employees, has a positive impact on the propensity to patent of Italian firms, where,
however, the relative effects on extensive and intensive margins are not disentangled. Our results show that firm
size is important to explain the gap between innovative and non-innovative firms, while it is statistically not
relevant to explain the depth of innovation in the sub-population of already innovative firms in low technology
industries.
Profitability and Revenues do not exert statistically relevant effects on extensive margins of innovation in
both types of industries. The capabilities of a firm to engage with innovation projects indeed tend to depend
on the firm’s long-term investment strategies rather than on short-term financial performance. This result is
13
consistent with previous studies finding that innovation strategies of firms in Continental economies tend to
be less responsive to cash flow variations than those of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts (see, e.g., Bond et al.,
1999; Mulkay et al., 2001).With Profitability, in particular, we measure the possible effect of current operational
profitability (i.e. an approximation of the level of free cash flow) on innovation, while one-year-lagged Revenues
is a proxy of short-term past financial background. It is interesting to note, however, that Profitability has a
positive effect on intensive margins for low technology firms and a negative effect on intensive margins for high
technology firms. This latter result is somewhat at odds with previous results indicating cash flow sensitivity
of high tech firms (see, e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2009), but can be explained by the fact that, while in low
technology firms a company’s profitability is probably a good proxy of short-term cash flow available for short-
run innovative investments, in high technology sectors, innovation may require longer periods of development
and short-term cash flow therefore may be negatively correlated with innovation output.
Finally, Sectoral growth has a positive impact on innovation only for old firms. This finding suggests that
relatively older incumbent firms may be positively stimulated by higher rates of sectoral revenues growth
and encouraged to overcome technological inertia. For this sub-group of firms, therefore, the bullish market
argument can be supported.
4.4 Robustness checks
We checked the robustness of our results with respect to three issues.
Heterogeneity of patent values. Patented inventions may have vastly different economic value and market
potential. As a consequence, firms might show a same number of patents while having different innovative
capabilities, to the extent that they produce innovations with a different economic value. If the value of patents
systematically vary across low technology and high technology sectors, a bias might be introduced in our
estimates. In a first robustness check, we verify whether our main estimation findings remain unchanged after
correcting the patenting activity dependent variable for unobservable factors that may increase (or reduce) the
economic relevance of a firm’s patents. In particular, we construct a new patents indicator, to be used as the
dependent variable in our regression analysis, in four steps (that follow the standard procedure generally used
to measure factor productivity, see Del Gatto et al. (2011)). First, we estimate the impact (%) of a firm’s
patents (Yi,t) on an index (Ψi,t) of the company’s current operational profitability (the EBITDA, i.e. earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) weighted by firm sales, controlling for unobservable
firm-level specific effects (µi), as in the following regression equation: Ψi,t = ζ0 + %Yi,t + µi + εi,t. Second,
we use the estimated parameter %ˆ together with the actual number of firms’ patents to compute each firm’s
predicted operational profitability as: Ψˆi,t = ζ0 + %ˆYi,t. Third, we calculate an index (ωi,t) as the observed
profitability to predicted profitability ratio (i.e. Ψi,t/Ψˆi,t), which measures how a firm is able to obtain greater
(or lower) profits from a given number of patents with respect to the average of the other firms showing the
same number of patents, all else (captured by firm fixed effects) being equal. If a firm couples its patents
with other innovative strategies and/or produces relatively high-value innovations, its patents will lead to an
observed economic performance (Ψi,t) higher than the predicted one (Ψˆi,t), then ωi,t > 1. Viceversa, if a firm
has patents with a relatively poor impact on its economic performance, then ωi,t < 1. Fourth, finally, we
construct a new patenting activity variable (Y augmentedi,t) combining multiplicatively the rough number of
patents Yi,t and ωi,t. Y augmentedi,t is then used as the dependent variable in the first robustness check of our
estimates, presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 6 for young firms and in columns (1) and (4) of Table 7
for old firms.
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Partnerships in patenting activity. Another important issue in patent data analysis is how to compare
patents obtained by a firm autonomously with those obtained by a (possibly high) number of firms in partner-
ship. In our baseline regressions we used a patents count variable (Yi,t) in which each patent awarded to n firms
in partnership equals 1 for each firm. It might be argued that a patent obtained by a firm autonomously requires
a relatively greater innovative effort and should weight relatively more. If innovation partnership strategies are
adopted by firms heterogeneously across low technology and high technology sectors, again a bias might be
introduced in our estimates. In a second robustness check, we therefore consider a weighted patenting activity
index (Y weightedi,t) as our dependent variable, measuring the firm level number of patents awarded in a given
year, where patents awarded to n firms in partnership are weighted by 1/n. Estimation results are presented
in columns (2) and (5) of Table 6 and (2) and (5) of Table 7 for young and old firms respectively.
Endogeneity of ownership. Where stock markets are particularly active, external investors who antici-
pate the success of firm investment strategies may decide to enter corporate ownership before innovations are
completed and patented, so enlarging the number of shareholders. In principle, this might introduce an endo-
geneity issue in the empirical analysis of corporate governance effects. Several studies, however, show that the
corporate governance structure of both listed and unlisted Italian companies is extremely stable (Bianchi and
Bianco, 2006; 2008) and that the Italian market for corporate control is characterized by a lack of contesta-
bility and opacity, irrespective of the sector considered. Dyck and Zingales (2004), among others, find that
Italy is one of the countries with the highest control premiums, giving incumbent owners great scope to dilute
minority shareholder powers and incentive to maintain existing blockholdings. It is, therefore, highly unlikely
that expected changes in firm innovation performance, as measured by patenting activity, trigger changes in
our ownership concentration variables. In any event, we check the robustness of our baseline estimates in a
two-stage instrumental variable regression. We instrument the ownership concentration indicator at a firm
level by means of the average ownership concentration level observed in the sector in which the firm operates.
While the degree of shares concentration in a firm is likely to be affected by the pattern of ownership structure
dominant in the industry, on the other hand the innovation performance of the firm does not impact on sectoral
patterns of ownership structure in a significant way. Specifically, we first re-code our ownership concentration
dummies in a discrete index (OC discrete) ranging from 1 to 3; we then regress firm-level values of OC discrete
on 2-digit sector-level averages and obtain firm-level instrumented values (OC instrumented); finally, we use
OC instrumented as an explanatory variable in the hurdle model regression, keeping all other regressors equal.
The results of this robustness check are presented in columns (3) and (6) of Table 6 and (3) and (6) of Table 7
for young and old firms respectively.
Table 6 about here
Table 7 about here
The results of the robustness checks confirm the statistical validity of our main findings. In particular,
higher ownership concentration rates have a positive and statistically significant effect on innovation for young
low technology firms and a negative effect for old firms in high technology industries. When the ownership
concentration indicator is instrumented, these results remain virtually unchanged. Moreover, similarly to our
baseline results, the estimated parameter of Debt to equity has a negative impact on innovation activity of
young firms in both low technology and high tecnology sectors and of old firms in low technology sectors, while
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it has no effect for old firms in high technology sectors, in all the model specifications considered in Table 6
and Table 7.7
5 Summary and conclusions
This paper has found that the statistical significance and sign of the relationship between corporate governance
variables and innovation vary according to the relative extent of asset specificity and agency costs involved
by firms’ activities, as predicted by firms’ age and sector of activity. More specifically, it has shown that the
effects of a firm’s ownership are coherent with the theoretical predictions of the shareholder theory and of
the stakeholder theory, respectively, according to whether agency cost effects dominate over asset specificity
effects, and vice-versa. The paper thus allows to address an empirical puzzle concerning the correlation between
ownership concentration and innovation, whose sign has not been so far unambiguously established, as there
are studies identifying both a positive and a negative relationship.
From a policy perspective, the analysis indicates that one-size-fits-all attempts to leverage on corporate
governance features to stimulate innovation are likely to miss their target because they overlook technology-
specificities. Corporate governance-related policy measures require a sector-specific approach. Moreover, we
confirm that innovation policies should be also graduated in relation to firm age, an approach that appears ever
more widespread among governments.
A joint reading of the evidence this paper provides on ownership concentration and financial structure may
offer some insights on how these general policy conclusions may be articulated. Our empirical investigation
shows that concentrated ownership exerts negative effects on established firms’ innovation propensity in high
tech sectors and that debt has a negative impact on the firm’s propensity to become innovative for the majority
of the firms in our dataset besides established high technology firms.
The combination of these two findings suggests that, while initiatives that increase the convenience of equity
financing are generally to be welcomed, the type of initiative that is likely to be most effective may change
according to the type of firm considered. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the stock of equity in a firm’s
balance sheet may increase because of an increase in retained earnings or because of new equity issues. In the
first case, the degree of ownership concentration does not vary. New equity issues, by contrast, may determine
a change in ownership structure, possibly in terms of a dilution of existing concentration. In light of this,
our findings suggest, first, that policy initiatives aiming at encouraging the reinvestment of the corporation’s
profits may be effective across the board and may be particularly suited to stimulate innovation for young firms
in low tech sectors, for which a high degree of ownership concentration appears to have a positive effect on
innovativeness and public listing on the stock market appears to have detrimental effects. Examples of these
policies include the provision of a reduced tax rate for (young) firms conditional on earnings being retained for
a specified period of time and other measures having the effect of raising the dividend tax and lowering the
capital gain tax. Second, the empirical evidence we provide indicates that established high tech firms may be
able to take the largest advantage from policies that favor an increase in equity funding while also promoting
more dispersed ownership structures. Examples of these are initiatives encouraging new equity issues as well
as support to venture capital funding.8
7We have also checked the statistical robustness of our results to the sector-level clustering of standard errors and to separate
estimation of the logit and the zero-truncated negative binomial equations. Again, estimation findings remain substantially
unchanged. Results are provided upon request.
8One such measure has been introduced in Italy at the end of 2011. It is a form of “Allowance for corporate equity - ACE”
consisting in the deductibility of the returns on new equity from the income tax and meant to redress the tendency of the corporate
tax system to discriminate in favour of debt financing by allowing the deduction of interest.
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Figure 1: Asset specificity, agency costs and firm heterogeneity.
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Table 1: Summary of variables’ description.
description source
Y Firm level number of patents awarded in a given year. Each patent
awarded to n firms in partnership equals 1 for each firm.
Authors’ elaboration on
PATSTAT (2013)
Total patents Total number of patents hold by the firm (over the 1978-2007 period).
Patents awarded to n firms in partnership are weighted by 1/n.
Authors’ elaboration on
PATSTAT (2013)
Intangibles Intangible assets (thousands of euro) to total assets ratio. Intangible
assets include formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, devel-
opment expenses.
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Firm size Number of employees. Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Listed Dummy variable (1 = the firm is listed in the stock market, 0 = other-
wise)
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Profitability EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortiza-
tion) weighted by firm total assets
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Revenues Revenues (thousands of euro) to number of employees ratio Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Debt to equity All of firm’s future obligations on the balance sheet relative to equity Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
OC-high Dummy variable (1 = one or more shareholders have direct or total (in-
direct) control of the firm by more than 50% of shares, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
OC-medium Dummy variable (1 = one or more shareholders have direct or total
(indirect) control of the firm by more than 25% and less than 50% of
shares, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
OC-low Dummy variable (1 = no shareholder has direct or total (indirect) con-
trol of the firm by more than 25%, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
RS-family Dummy variable (1 = the representative shareholder is an individual or
a family, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
RS-bank Dummy variable (1 = the representative shareholder is a bank, 0 =
otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
RS-holding Dummy variable (1 = the representative shareholder is a financial hold-
ing company, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
RS-ind company Dummy variable (1 = the representative shareholder is an industrial
company, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
RS-other Dummy variable (1 = the representative shareholder is a mutual or pen-
sion fund, a private equity company, an insurance company or does not
fit in the previous categories, 0 = otherwise).
Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Italian RS Dummy variable (1 = the representative is Italian, 0 = otherwise). Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Sectoral growth 2-digit sectoral average of firm revenues’ yearly growth rate. Authors’ elaboration on
Aida (BvD, 2013)
Table 2: High technology and low technology sectoral clusters.
Low technology High technology
Building and repairing of ships and boats Aircraft and spacecraft
Rubber and plastics products Pharmaceuticals
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel Office, accounting and computing machinery
Other non-metallic mineral products Radio, TV and communciations equipment
Basic metals and fabricated metal products Medical, precision and optical instruments
Recycling Electrical machinery and apparatus
Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Food products, beverages and tobacco Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear Machinery, railroad equipment and transport equipment
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of firm-level variables: young firms (age <= 15 years).
Low technology sectors High technology sectors
Innovative Non innovative Innovative Non innovative
firms firms firms firms
(0.34% of the low tech. (99.66% of the low tech. (1.37% of the high tech. (98.63% of the high tech.
young firms sample) young firms sample) young firms sample) young firms sample)
Total patents (mean [std.dev.]) 2.48 [3.18] 0.00 [0.00] 3.34 [4.17] 0.00 [0.00]
Intangibles (mean [std.dev.]) 0.21 [0.24] 0.15 [0.21] 0.30 [0.27] 0.21 [0.25]
Firm age (mean [std.dev.]) 8.51 [4.36] 7.50 [4.34] 7.92 [4.37] 7.85 [4.30]
Firm size (mean [std.dev.]) 142.98 [290.50] 24.31 [91.47] 163.90 [523.54] 43.53 [362.99]
Listed (%) 0.79 0.01 1.35 0.14
Profitability (mean [std.dev.]) 0.15 [2.35] 0.32 [22.69] 0.02 [0.06] 0.42 [46.34]
Revenues (mean [std.dev.]) 300.52 [400.33] 260.46 [418.62] 270.11 [204.88] 281.67 [574.83]
Debt to equity (mean [std.dev.]) 4.05 [27.12] 3.09 [14.82] 1.78 [4.27] 2.65 [12.70]
OC-high (%) 72.11 53.68 72.16 58.04
OC-medium (%) 22.70 37.77 21.62 34.91
OC-low (%) 4.78 5.93 4.59 5.11
RS-family (%) 48.25 75.52 40.06 65.49
RS-bank (%) 2.48 0.77 1.98 1.06
RS-holding(%) 5.47 4.20 7.94 5.58
RS-ind company (%) 18.78 23.14 46.68 26.70
RS-other (%) 1.49 0.71 3.31 1.15
Italian RS (%) 85.05 96.69 82.35 90.78
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of firm-level variables: old firms (age > 15 years).
Low technology sectors High technology sectors
Innovative Non innovative Innovative Non innovative
firms firms firms firms
(0.62% of the low tech. (99.38% of the low tech. (1.62% of the high tech. (98.38% of the high tech.
young firms sample) young firms sample) young firms sample) young firms sample)
Total patents (mean [std.dev.]) 3.86 [5.57] 0.00 [0.00] 5.61 [12.67] 0.00 [0.00]
Intangibles (mean [std.dev.]) 0.10 [0.14] 0.08 [0.15] 0.17 [0.20] 0.13 [0.19]
Firm age (mean [std.dev.]) 29.74 [14.63] 28.31 [11.91] 27.17 [11.15] 27.39 [11.36]
Firm size (mean [std.dev.]) 211.44 [487.43] 51.52 [171.57] 257.51 [639.81] 73.75 [238.03]
Listed (%) 1.06 0.10 0.79 0.22
Profitability (mean [std.dev.]) 0.01 [0.02] 0.16 [21.47] 0.01 [0.03] 0.07 [8.70]
Revenues (mean [std.dev.]) 251.32 [192.05] 262.90 [448.38] 234.43 [135.74] 247.80 [481.74]
Debt to equity (mean [std.dev.]) 1.40 [2.59] 2.08 [9.39] 1.44 [2.65] 1.89 [10.56]
OC-high (%) 59.18 46.85 62.10 54.62
OC-medium (%) 31.41 39.71 27.57 36.07
OC-low (%) 8.54 9.69 9.52 7.54
RS-family (%) 36.64 63.65 36.02 58.61
RS-bank (%) 1.98 0.95 1.25 0.89
RS-holding(%) 12.5 6.62 14.10 6.56
RS-ind company (%) 47.15 27.73 47.35 32.66
RS-other (%) 1.70 1.03 1.25 1.26
Italian RS (%) 91.97 96.04 87.33 89.77
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